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BIG BANG VS. GRADUALISM 
Lauren Sims 
Which method of transitioning is the most successful? A comparison of selected 
macroeconomic issues in the Czech Republic and Hungary attempts to find the answer, and 
lays the foundation for understanding how Central European Economies fit into the EU 
model. 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY 
Although Central European Economies (CEEs) had political systems that were 
heavily influenced by the same source, namely the Soviet Union and its brand of socialism, 
their transitions to market structures following the collapse of communism were markedly 
different. While some pursued "shock therapy:' others attempted a smoother transition by 
choosing a more gradual approach, which sometimes integrated reforms previously adopted 
during socialism. Despite different methods, CEE countries shared COlIDnon setbacks, the 
most notable being high levels of inflation (in Western terms) and recession. Is a gradual 
approach more beneficial than a "big-bang?" A comparison between Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, which opted for gradualisln and shock therapy respectively, suggests that 
both have advantages and disadvantages, but that neither is necessarily superior. Such a 
conclusion can be drawn from inspection of the major differences in their privatization, 
taxation, and exchange rJte/monetary policies. Although both countries attacked the 
problem of transition in different ways, Hungary and the Czech Republic, along with the 
rest of the Central European countries recently inducted into the European Union, face 
tremendous hurdles to a successful financial EU integration and adoption of the euro. 
The argument over whether gradualism or shock therapy is "better" for a transitioning 
economy has become an increasingly contested issue as statistical results of the 1990s wide-
scale conversions are released and reevaluated. The transition of an economy generally 
occurs simultaneously with a change in political structure, as was the case for CEE countries 
following the collapse of COlIDnunism in the early 1990s. For purposes of this paper, the 
transitional process involves not only the change of capital from state to private hands, but 
also the reconfiguration of all economic institutions that affect the freedom of markets, 
Big Bang vs. Gradualism
130 LAUREN SIMS Scripps College 
namely those relating to monetary policy and state regulations, so as to conform to the 
Western model. Gradualism attempts to achieve tlus through small econonuc changes over 
time, which are strategically measured to dinunish fallout from inflationary pressures and 
unemployment. To obtain the same outcomes, shock therapy attempts to transform all 
policies simultaneously. Both camps generally believe that the other is inefficient and will 
result in significant unemployment and inflation. Statistical analysis has been difficult in 
providing a clear winner, especially as " the sources, coverage, and quality of macroecononuc 
data in transition economies have varied dramatically over the past decade" (Filer & 
Hanousek, 2002, p. 226). 
POLITICAL CLIMATES 
Hungary's political climate was strikingly different from many other CEE econonUes 
prior to 1989. Its Conununist party possessed a strong reform wing that had been able to 
effect changes from the 1950s until the fall of the party at the end of the 1980s. 
Unfortunately, reforms made prior to the 1980s were largely reversed by the Hungarian 
government's "policies of illusion" that quashed previous market-oriented restructuring in 
favor of a more protectionist Central Plan in response to the external impacts of the 1970s 
oil shock (Hare et al., 1992, p. 230). Despite this setback, the reform wing was able to 
establish lasting capitalist changes to Hungary's economy in the 1980s. Perhaps the most 
significant alteration of the era was the development of a "second economy," which arose 
due to the legalization of small-scale businesses in various sectors in 1981 (Hare et al., 1002, 
p. 229-33) 1. In 1990, estimates placed industrial output of privately held small firms at 10 
percent of the entire country (234).These businesses increased social tensions between those 
who remained on state incomes and "people with the right skills to earn high incom.es" 
and! or enough wealth to become entrepreneurs (229). With the advent of these newly 
profitable companies, the government was forced to develop a better tax system and in 1988, 
alongside price liberalization, the personal income tax (PIT) and value added tax (VAT) 
were created (233-235). Hungary already had fleeting market experience with taxes in the 
past, when in 1968 the New EcononUc Mechanism allowed for industry (rather than state) 
control of some firms, producing profits that needed to be assessed and redistributed by the 
government (235). These new initiatives were "aimed at shifting the revenue burden from 
enterprise profits taxation to point-of-sale and personal incom.e taxes, and closing the array 
ofloopholes that fostered particularistic bargaining" (Bartlett, 1996, p. 61). In 1980, Hungary 
was one of the first CEE countries to have undergone price reform, which unfortunately 
led to declining terms of trade and increased inflation. This in turn negatively affected 
Hungary's national debt (Bartlett, 1996, p. 54). Finally, business formation received a boost 
with the introduction of the 1988 Enterprise Law, under which "new firms became limited 
liability companies" (Hare, Revesz, Aven, Oblath, & Hans-Werner, 1992, p. 234). Ultimately 
the creation of the 'second economy' was only a flirtation with an actual market structure, 
and Hall's report in 1989 that "there [was] no bankruptcy rate to speak of in Hungary" 
indicates that soft-budget constraints fostered by the Socialist leniency were still a major 
source of inefficiency (Hall, 1989, p. 476). While econonuc reforms were much more 
complicated than presented here, these examples serve to establish that, in stark contrast to 
countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary had more than a decade of prior practice with 
markets before they began complete economic and political transition in the 1990s. This 
period gave Hungarian politicians experience necessary to conceptualize the ultim.ate goals 
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of transition and to enact measures over time to gradually shift the Hungarian economic 
institutions. 
Like Hungary, Czechoslovakia's political climate following the Velvet Revolution was 
dissimilar from other CEE countries . Tensions between Slovakia and the Czech Lands 
(Bohenua and Moravia) ran high after different experiences with the socialist structure. 
When the regions were combined in 1918 to establish Czechoslovakia, Slovakia accounted 
for 23 percent of the population, but contributed a mere 8 percent and 12 percent of 
industrial income and total national income respectively. Being already industrialized, the 
Czech Lands received the majority of foreign investment, and the distribution of income 
between the regions remained almost unchanged until the Second World War, when 
Germany began to increase the productivity of Slovakia for military advantage (Capek & 
Sazama, 1993, pp. 212-13). Following the war, the installation of a CPE (centrally planned 
economy) lead to the further development of Slovakian industry, causing industry output to 
rise to 68 percent of total Slovak production by 1989 (Capek & Sazama, 1993, p. 214). Rapid 
growth was largely the result of the redistribution of capital for industrial investment from 
the Czech Lands to Slovak Lands, allowing the Slovak economy to come close to parity 
with its counterpart (Slovak production in 1989 realized 30.4 percent of the Czechoslovak 
GDP for 33.7 percent of the population) (Capek, 1993, pp. 215-18; Hilde, 1999, p. 648). By 
analyzing these statistics, it is no surprise that Slovakia was content with the socialist 
government and preferred to approach econonUc reform after 1989 in a cautious manner. 
While the Czech Lands experienced growth during the same period, the results were much 
more reserved, causing Czech citizens to overwhelnungly demand aggressive econonUc 
reforms to combat the relative stagnancy of the last several decades (Capek & Sazama, 1993, 
p.,218) , Although there were other nationalist and symbolic cleavages between both areas, a 
major impetus for the break in 1993 was econonUc irreconcilability felt on both sides, This 
sentiment is well-surnused by Slovak Prime Minister Carnogursky's statement that "Slovakia 
simply want[ ed] to tackle its economic problems by making its own decisions" (Hilde, 1999, 
p.657). 
The political climates of both countries are important to recognize for a few key 
reasons, First, the stagnancy of Czechoslovakian industrial growth concurrent with massive 
industrial growth in Slovakia via centrally planned investment redistribution serves as an 
indicator that the Czech Republic2 was "a stalwart example of traditional central planning 
until 1989" (Brom, 1994, p. 894). This is in direct contrast to the Hungarian environment, 
where forward-thinking politicians and econonusts implemented market-oriented reforms 
when it was apparent that the CPE structure was not indefinitely sustainable. While 
Hungary's reforms had already begun, the Czech Republic had to start from scratch both 
politically and econonucally following the Velvet Revolution. Each country also 
experienced relatively peaceful conversions politically (Munck, 1997) , which is not 
necessarily the case for all transitioning economies around the world. However, the nature 
of the individual relationships between each country and the U.S.S.R. were very different, 
as instanced by the eventual occupation of the Czech Republic by Soviet forces in 1968, 
while Hungary experienced a small amount of leniency (e.g. its ability to enact capitalist-
based structural legislation throughout communist rule) . It is important to note that the 
issues surrounding these countries are specific to the Czech and Hungarian cases, and that 
such a comparison between gradual and "shock therapy" countries may not be universally 
applicable to other CEE states, Conclusions may be drawn from the following comparisons 
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between privatization, tax regulation, and exchange rate and monetary policies that indicate 
certain advantages to each method. 
PRIVATIZATION AND BANK BAILOUTS 
Hungarian privatization in the 1990s was preceded by changes that occurred in the 
early 1980s. Small-scale firms were allowed beginning in 1981, and the program was greatly 
extended with the Law on Economic Association in 1988, which called for the selling of 
state-owned industries at fair value prices to both foreign and domestic interests (O'Toole, 
1994, pp. 500-501). In fact, foreign buyers were encouraged "because of the lack of capital 
and capital markets" available to Hungary at the time (O'Toole, 1994, p. 501). Gray surmises 
that domestic investors were often difficult to procure because of the information deficit 
surrounding the condition of the industries for sale, whereas foreign investors were willing 
to take risks (Gray, 1996, p. 185).To attract buyers, the Hungarian government could arrange 
for the purchase of firms through instaUm.ents, but this meant more risk to the goverrunent 
as inflation and managen'lent issues sometimes led to the inability of the purchaser to 
produce enough profits to pay up (Gray, 1996, p. 185). The Hungarian government opted 
to relinquish major control of the share selling! distribution process to the state property 
agency (SPA) which was " charged both with facilitating the sale of state properties and 
monitoring transactions to ensure fair prices and a minimum of insider deals" and which 
was also supposed to monitor workers' interests and unemployment to prevent major 
instability (O'Toole, 1994, pp. 501-503). SPA made some efforts to reform the privatization 
process, which included preprivatiz ation for conversion of smaller firms through fewer steps, 
active privatization for large firms, and self-privatizaiton in which "reasonably size[ed firms 
could] select private consulting firms to assist them in fulfilling the legal requirements of the 
privatization process and arrange a scale" (504). 
Although Hungary has been one of the most successful countries to transition via 
direct sales (in 1995, 40 percent by value of Hungarian firms had been sold to outside 
owners) (Gray, 1996, p. 184), the method was not unproblematic. First, the inability of some 
installment-based purchasers to repay the government caused difficulty in the banking 
sector and ultimately shrank the availability of credit (Gray) . "Re-nationalizing' firms was 
not an option because it would have been too complicated, and therefore businesses facing 
bankruptcy either had to be bailed out by the government or fail. Furthermore, the process 
of direct sales is expensive and slow because of the need to evaluate each offer individually, 
as well as to monitor whether the industry is performing acceptably afterward (in terms of 
workers' rights and unemployment) (Gray, 1996, p. 185). According to Campbell, the 
government revenues from privatization by 1993 were an underwhelming one-third of the 
budget deficit, which reduced the hope that the deficit could be cured by direct sale 
privatization (Campbell, 1996, pp. 61-62). The situation was further complicated by 
corruption within the privatization institutions, namely the SPA and managerial sector. 
O'Toole notes the ability for managers of state-held firms to "take advantage of central 
weakness and opportunities in the law to convert public assets into private gain," and there 
were also complaints over the SPA's slow pace due to "bureaucratic overregulation" (502). 
For a country with pre-market experience (from 1980's reforms), it is somewhat surprising 
that the First Program of privatization in 1990 was "viewed by all concerned as a failure." 
Subsequently, the Second in 1991 was only slightly more successful , with the goverrunent 
losing $72.3 million per month in 1992 to companies that failed to be privatized through 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/13
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 133 
either program (O'Toole, 1994, p. 508). 
The Czech model for privatization was very different from the Hungarian, but it too 
had problems. Because the Czechs had faced relative stagnation under socialism, they were 
eager to nuke economic transitions as quickly as possible. Voucher privatization was the 
method chosen for most dispersion of state-owned capitaP and implemented by the 1990 
Law on Transfer4 partially because reformers believed that the government could distribute 
shares of companies quickly, fairly, and easily by avoiding the direct sale approach (which was 
perceived as slow and costly as in Hungary) (Dlouhy & Mladek, 1994, p. 157). The program 
was based on the theory that "breaking the links with the state was the primary hurdle, and 
that the political window of opportunity had to be seized quickly" (Gray, 1996, p. 183). The 
program involved the selling of shares of cOlnpanies for fairly low prices, which the 
government hoped would limit the problem of low domestic capital while still allowing 
foreign investment through "equal-access vouchers" (Gray, 1996, p. 190). However, questions 
remain over whether the Czech privatization was that at all, as firms were considered 
"privatized" when only a minimum of 20 percent was held in private hands. The rest was 
divided among the govermnent (20 percent) , state-owned banks (40 percent) and the 
National Property Fund - "NPF" - (up to 20 percent) (Brom, 1994, p. 894). However, the 
NPF and Konsolidacnl Banka provided predominantly monetary support to guard 
businesses and society by protecting against bankruptcy, which would have resulted in high 
unemployment (Brom, 1994, pp. 894-895). Therefore, these institutions were not directly 
involved in the management of the companies, and had more of a peripheral role as financial 
backers. 
Problem.s with voucher privatization were largely tied to the inability of the Czech 
govermnent to properly regulate the managers overseeing redistribution of company shares 
and profits, which lead to inefficiencies and corruption (as in the Hungarian case) (Hare, 
Revesz,Aven, Oblath, & Hans-Werner, 1992, p. 230). Similarly, people who put little money 
into their shares (due to the low cost of vouchers and the restrictions on how many shares 
could be bought) have less of an incentive to demand or encourage aggressive restructuring 
toward efficiency (Gray, 1996, p. 190). Because of the simultaneous evolution of the political 
and economic spheres, the Czech Republic lacked a proper legal framework, especially with 
regards to regulation of businesses after they were sold (Hare, 1992; Dlouhy & Mladek, 1994, 
p. 160) . This has lead to inefficiencies and the dissemination of profits to minority 
shareholders, rather than the reinvestment of funds into the business to increase efficiency 
and productivity (Hare, Revesz, Aven, Oblath, & Hans-Werner, 1992, p. 231). More 
importantly, equal-access voucher privatization "did not generate new investment funds and 
skills, and it provided little revenue for the govermnent" (Hare, Revesz, Aven, Oblath, & 
Hans-Werner, 1992, p. 231). Interestingly, while the govermnent believed that purchasers of 
vouchers would put most money into individual businesses, over 72 percent of buyers put 
their money into investment funds instead, a few of which accumulated so many shares that 
the same fund often owned majority stakes in competing com.panies (Gray, 1996, p. 193). 
It is clear that both the Hungarian and Czech privatization methods were hampered 
by m any of the same problems, and the same can be said with their tax systems, especially 
with regard to their debts. Hungary faced a significant amount of debt, mainly from the 
failure of industry to adequately predict market fluctuations. The unexpected collapse of 
COMECON (The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) , which affected all CEE 
economies, caused many of Hungary's state-owned enterprises to default on their bank 
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loans. At the same time speculators expecting price increases in certain sectors stockpiled 
product without properly accounting for inflation's impact on demand (Adam, 1995, p. 
994), and companies could not afford to pay for the pre-ordered items. In 1992,20 percent 
of bank debt in both the Czech R epublic and Hungary was from such defaulted loans 
(Campbell, 1996, p. 65). Businesses were not the only affected - so too were banks, many of 
which faced insolvency if the government didn't pursue bailouts (which in turn increased 
debt) (Adam, 1995, p. 994; Campbell, 1996, p. 72) . Problems were worsened in Hungary by 
the high social welfare standards, especially with an increasing number of unemployed and 
pensioners (Adam, 1995, p. 992). 
While the Czech Republic did face similar bank bailouts and the problems with a 
collapsed COMECON, it had relatively fewer problems balancing its budget and thereby 
incurred little additional debt at the initial political transition (Campbel, 1996, p. I 69). 
Campbell argues that this is a result of "several unique advantages, that helped minimize 
deficits, such as a good tourist industry, a skilled labor-force, and a relatively modern 
manufacturing and technological base that helped prevent the enormous declines in output 
and employment that other countries suffered" (1996, p. 69) . In 1994, the unemployment 
rate in the Czech Republic was a mere 4 percent, eliminating the need for over-spending 
on welfare programs. Furthermore, consistently low wages in the early 1990s helped to keep 
profits of enterprises high, allowing taxable profit levels to remain steady (Campbell, 1996. 
P 69). However, this does not mean that debt was not incurred, even though in 1990 the 
external debt in the Czech Republic was below 20 percent (Svejnar, 2002, p. 12). 
Unemployment was artificially kept high by the Klaus government, which "used the still 
publicly-owned banking sector ' to support non-viable firms so as to minimize 
unemployment" - in effect wasting funds that could have been spent on increasing 
productivity and efficiency (Bryson, 2000, p. 510). It is clear that adequate tax systems were 
necessary in both Hungary and the Czech Republic to facilitate debt repayment. 
TAXATION MODELS 
Hungary's implementation of both the value added tax and personal income tax in 
1988 (Hare, Revesz, Aven, Oblath, & Hans-Werner, 1992, pp. 233- 235) gave an advantage 
to the country when privatization efforts increased following the collapse of the 
goverl1l11ent. The measures taken in 1988 attempted to foster the growth of enterprises by 
eliminating heavy taxation on enterprises and instead focusing on citizens (Adam, 1995, p. 
990). Reformers in the 1980s recognized that the allowance oflega! small-scale firms in the 
economy provided for the taxation of the black market (the former "second economy"), 
which would increase overall revenue generation. According to Hare, these pre-cursors to 
the 1990s gave Hungary the ability to "contemplate both the complete dismantling of the 
old tax/subsidy system, and large scale privatization, without fearing that goverl1lllent 
revenues [were] ·at risk" (1992, p. 235). Such an advantage was especially important in the 
elimination of "distorting taxes and subsidies" and an attempt at price liberalization before 
other countries had been able to fully install proper tax systems. 
The Czech R epublic, on the other hand, had little experience with taxation because 
of the strict CPE standards (which didn't require a complicated tax system) (Coulter, 1995, 
p. 1008) . The country was forced to implement taxes without having the experience of 
knowing how successful they would be. Striving to achieve tax equity, "corporate tax rates 
were unified" and a "broad-based" income tax was implemented (Campbell, 1996, p. 54). 
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The income tax introduced in 1993, which effectively replaced the wage tax (Coulter, 1995, 
p. 1011) , is progressive and ranges from 15 percent to 40 percent of personal income 
(Bryson, 2000, p. 514). Direct and indirect taxes were also fairly balanced at their inception, 
with 54 percent accounting for the indirect portion (Bryson, 2000, p. 514). However, a 
major problem with the Czech taxation system was related to the proliferation of 
municipalities following the Velvet Revolution - in 2000 the number was an estimated 6234 
(Byrson, 2000, p. 512). WIllie the creation of municipalities was beneficial from a democratic 
point of view, as "local goverrunents can be more acceptable because its agents are more 
accessible and are more clearly accountable" (Bryson, 2000, p. 507) , the Czech Republic had 
not adequately thought out the funding of thousands of small goverrunents and the 
subsequent thousands of public projects. The property tax was the greatest source of funding 
for such municipalities, but is largely flawed due to the fact that "policy design and 
implementation remain almost exclusively the domain of the ministers of Finance and 
Interior" (Bryson, 2000, p. 512) , who cannot adequately determine what property tax levels 
should be for the distinct needs of all municipalities. For instance, property taxes from 1989 
to 1993 actually decreased from 1.4 percent of overall tax revenue to only 1.0 percent, even 
though there was clearly a demand for higher levels of local funding (Coulter, 1995, p. 
1011). To circumvent the issue, municipalities have resorted to selling off land given to them 
by the government during privatization, but these are sources of one-time funding and tllls 
method will merely prolong the need for a re-evaluation of the system (Bryson, 2000, p. 
514) . Some municipalities have simply resorted to going into debt, reallocating the problems 
to banks and ultimately the national government, which will have to payoff those loans to 
protect bank failure. 
EXCHANGE RATE AND CURRENCY REFORM 
The existence in Hungary of a fairly well-functioning tax system at the start of the 
1990s (relative to other CEE countries), allowed for much more accessible exchange rate 
reforms, especially in comparison to the Czech Republic. Devaluation of currency was 
important to spur exports and reach some kind of stable and controllable monetary policy 
(Svejnar, 2002, p. 11). Differences in the structures of Czech and Hungarian exchange rate 
reform are not vast, considering that both chose to utilize a pegged exchange rate as 
opposed to floating their currencies. This method was preferred by some CEE countries 
because in theory, it claimed to have an impact on protecting GOP through, according to 
Sachs, the establishment of monitor-able targets, coordinating price-and wage-setters, and 
protecting consumers from the fallout of recent high inflation (Sachs, 1996, p. 149). It was 
the method of policy implementation, as well as different levels of political and econonllc 
development, that caused variations in outcomes. Hungary, which again chose a gradualist 
approach, largely escaped inflationary pressure. This m.ay not only have been caused by a 
slow devaluation: Hungary received $1.5 billion in foreign investment in 1990, creating a 
surplus and lowering the inflation rate by increasing demand for the Hungarian j10rint 
(Alms, 1992, p. 985) . The country's use of direct central bank loans, rather than servicing the 
debt through the printing of money (although they did increase the money supply slightly), 
created non-inflationary funding for the Hungarian debt (986) . Unfortunately, this lead to 
high interest rates which, along with excessively high reserve rations in excess of 55 percent 
in 1991 , deterred businesses from borrowing to invest (986-88). The j10rint enjoyed fairly 
positive appreciation, 1.5 percent and 11.5 percent in 1990 and 1991, respectively (Alms, 
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1992, p. 992). The Czech devaluation of the koruna was also fairly successful , but the attempt 
to keep inflation low ultim.ately caused it to remain undervalued for some time (Stolze, 
1997, p. 25). Peter Green surmised that the problems with the koruna that kept it from fully 
appreciating were related to " the continued poor performance of the Czech economy and 
the government 's apparent inability to cut its trade and current-account deficits" (Green, 
1997) . The undervaluation may have been a result of the Czech lack of market experience, 
as it was simultaneously opening its trading borders and changing its currency structure. 
Hungary, on the other hand, already had familiarity with trading and thus valued its 
currency more appropriately. N evertheless, in both the Czech R epublic and Hungary in 
1994, inflation was below 100 percent (low for transitioning standards), showing that the 
devaluation of both was fairly successful for macroeconomic stability (Sachs, 1996, p. 149). 
The J-curve helps to illustrate some of the effects that currency devaluation had on 
national GDP in the cases of both the C zech R epublic and Hungary. It suggests that when 
a curren cy is devalued, imports and exports will remain at relatively the same levels as before 
(due to their inelasticity) , causing the balance of payments problem to get worse as imports 
are n ow significantly more expensive. Eventually, the trading partners will realize the lower 
cost of the country's products, and exports will rise. In the cases of Hungary and the Czech 
R epublic, once economic transition had progressed for ahnost a decade, "currency pegs 
were plagued by a real appreciation of domestic currencies and subsequent increases in 
foreign currency debt which generated financial instability" (Aglietta, 2003, p. 971) . This 
trend is apparent at the end of the J-curve, which tapers off and may even decline due to 
lower exports of products abroad because countries can no longer afford the appreciated 
values (the importing countries' currencies may not have yet appreciated in response). 
FIGURE 1: HYPOTHETICAL J-CURVE 
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(becom.es more negative) due to currency devaluation, and then rises (becomes 
more p ositive) above its original level. 
Table 1: Czech and Hungarian Growth RatesS 
Year Czech R. Hungary 
1987 2.1 4.1 
1988 0.6 -0.1 
1989 2 0.7 
1990 4.5 -3.5 
1991 
-1.2 -11 .9 
1992 
-11.5 -3.1 
1993 ,.:323 
-0.6 
1994 0.6 2.9 
1995 3:2 3.5 
1996 6.4 1.3 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that these countries took different speed approaches to the transition 
process, but as Table 1 indicates, both Hungary and the Czech R epublic experienced some 
kind of recessionary pressures with similar statistics. However, it should be noted that these 
"recessions," having stemmed from governmental and political change, are very different 
from those in already stable and industrialized countries (as in the United States, UK, etc). 
The qu estion ultim.ately isn't over why countries must (or generally do) have recession: the 
J-curve highlights just one maj or reason why the devaluation of currency ultimately results 
in lowered GDP (though not necessarily negative growth rates). T he question becomes 
whether or not we should value one method of transition over another. From a strictly 
theoretical standpoint, it is logical that gradualism would be favored because it allows for the 
reevaluation of policies before they are fully implemented. H owever, despite Hungary's 
advantages, especially with regard to the pre- establishment of privatization methods and a 
fairly well-developed tax system (both of which gave market experience to Hungary while 
the other CEEs remained lIllred in C PEs) , it could not escape its own difficulties . O 'Toole 
and H are believe that because Hungary's reform m easures weren't planned simultaneously, 
it couldn't adequately reconcile the new, more aggressive reforms necessary after the 
complete collapse of the Central Planning Office. On the other hand, taxation policy and 
the inability for privatization methods to produce new skill and finances for the Czech 
government suggest that "shock therapy" leaves governments playing a dangerous guessing 
game about w hat policies it will be able to appropriately coordinate. Furthermore, it is 
logical that the extensive implementation required by a "big bang" would not only be a 
source of great confusion, but would also require massive amounts of infrastructural capital. 
Gradualists are able to implement policy over time as goals are achieved and as funds and 
personnel become available, but policies made 10 or even 20 years prior to the realization 
of the "whole picture" may no longer be relevant, ultimately requiring that reforms be 
themselves reformed. 
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E valuating the Hungarian perspective m akes it clear that gradualism must be 
accompanied by a specific political climate at a specific time: even the reform wing of the 
Conullunist party in the 1980s couldn't have predicted that the fall of conullunisll1 would 
com e so rapidly. Was what happened to Hungary a mixture of gradualism and "big bang," 
as in 1990 the refonll process needed to be revamped to fa cilitate a rapidly changing 
political structure? For the purposes of this analysis, it is appears that the most important 
reforms fo r the Hungarian economy were made prior to the fall of conullunism , especially 
in 1988. It may be unfair to say that any other country could choose to pursue the sanle 
approach unless a similarly influential reform wing could effect change prior to a 
governm.ental collapse. 
The fact that advantages and disadvantages exist fo r each approach means that, from a 
strictly economic sense, the "best" transition method cannot be selected because the 
outcom es rely on subj ective rulings. Was it better for the Czech government to compromise 
effi ciency for the sake of j ob protection via the Konsolidacni Banka in order to transition 
m ore rapidly? O r was Hungary wrong in using high reserve ratios to slow growth by 
deterring investment borrowing? Depending on one's perspective, both situations are 
appropriate. In fact, the "best" approach may be neither gradualism nor shock therapy, but 
som ething in the middle: a method that takes account of the situations of countries on an 
individual basis and assesses which policy areas need reform m ost quickly. Ultimately, I'm 
not convinced that "speed" should be the focus of any theory on transitioning economies -
we should focus m ore on what policies are best coordinated to avoid macroeconomic 
instability and only then worry about the rapidity of policy implem entation . Although 
recessio n may be unavoidable, the m ost suitable policy reform m easures for each economy 
should produce a plan that executes a transition at the most appropriate speed, which may be 
neither quick nor slow. 
While speed sho uld perhaps not be a major consideration for transition, the outcomes 
that both countries faced will have important implicatio ns for their ability to becom e fully 
integrated into the European Union. H aving effectively established new currencies in the 
1990s gives each of these countries an idea of the logistical enormity that the switch to the 
Euro will entail. H owever, changing to the Euro will entail much diffe rent challenges. These 
countries have now established functi oning price system s, which were largely absent before 
the fall of conullunism . Furthermore, while the banking systems are not as solid as in some 
other m ember countries, the EU boasts exceptional exam.ples (e.g. Germany), and appears 
generally willing to offer advice. A larger issue m ay lie in the transition to the physical bank 
notes and coins them selves. Like other countries, giving up the national currency is very 
difficult in terms of cultural identification, but it m ay be more so in countries that have just 
recently reinvigorated and discovered their own sense of national "self" . C ountries like 
Hungary and the Czech Republic had extremely powerful political m ovements rife with a 
new sense of nationalism , and while their goverrullents clearly see the economic benefits of 
switching to the Euro, giving up something so closely tied to the defeat over comrnunism 
will not be easy. R egardless of the willingness of CEEs to rapidly switch to the Euro, the 
European Union must approach these and other Central European countries with caution: 
forcing changes too quickly could disrupt the foundations upon which these CEE countries 
are based , not only in economic terms, but also politically. Avoiding recessions tied to a 
currency change w ill enable these countries to continue to m ove toward reaching EU 
average GDP levels. These countries offer exceptional sites for EU growth and industrial 
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development. However, to take advantage of these opportunities, fonner EU-15 members 
must attempt to recognize and understand the cultural, political, and economic transitions 
that CEE countries faced less than two decades ago, and act accordingly. Failing to do so 
will j eopardize the continued development and transition of CEE countries, and therefore 
the success of the European Union as a whole. 
END NOTES 
1. Tlus topic will be further explored during a discussion on privatization. 
2. From this point on, I will refer to Czechoslovakia, under which many reforms were 
made until 1993, as the Czech Republic, to avoid confusion over statistics that refer 
only to the Czech Republic. 
3. Restitution, public auction, public tender, direct sales, and joint-stock companies were 
also used, but the voucher program is the form most conunonly associated with the 
Czech Republic by the scholars I have encountered. 
4. The official title was the Law on Transfer of State Ownership of Certain Properties to 
Other Legal or Natural Persons 
5. Table adapted from "GDP Annual Growth Rate" published by the Centro de Economia 
Internacional (CEI) and available at 
www.cei.gov.ar/ingles/ estadisticasl internacional/Excell cuadro4_EN.xls. 
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